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Living La Vida Lex Mercatoria 
Helen E. Hartnell * 
I. - INTRODUCTION 
My two-year sojourn at the University of Cologne (2004-2006) provided an 
intense occasion for living la vida lex mercatoria. This essay explores key 
facets of that experience. At the outset, I approach the topic from a traditional 
scholarly perspective, first by offering a brief overview of theoretical debates 
about the lex mercatoria, then by arguing the need for more social scientific 
(and particularly empirical) research in this field. Next my focus shifts to the 
Willertl C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot (Vis Moot), and 
considers the role of legal education in reproducing the lex mercatoria as a 
living phenomenon. In each of these contexts, I garner and examine available 
empirical evidence, and suggest ways in which interdisciplinary research 
might enrich our knowledge of the transnational legal field. Finally, the essay 
takes up some broader questions that arose during my two years in Cologne, 
particularly relating to the extreme skepticism with which German colleagues 
greeted my socio-legal 1 turn. In the spirit of carrying on the discussions that 
began during those years, I conclude with some comparative reflections on 
multi-/interdisciplinarity in the legal academy. Thus, as a whole, this essay 
* Professor of law, Golden Gate University School of law, San Francisco (United States 
of America) and DMD GastlehrstuhlfUr anglo-amerikanisches Recht, Freie UniversitatBerlin 
(Germany) (WS 2006-07). This is an updated and expanded version of a contribution made under 
the same title to Klaus Peter Berger I Georg Borges I Harald Herrmann I Andreas SchlUter I Ulrich 
Wackerbarth (Eds.), Zivil- und Wirtschaftsrecht im Europaischen und G/obalen Kontext: Festschrift 
fUr Norbert Horn zum 70. Geburtstag - Private and Commercial Law in a European and Global 
Context (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht 2006), 355-376, and is republished with the kind permission of 
De Gruyter Recht. 
1 'I use the term "socio-Iegal" to include the full panoply of multi- and interdisciplinary 
approaches to the study of law, despite the term's semantic limitations. The "law and society" 
tradition in the United States includes the widest imaginable range of approaches to the study of 
law, including but not limited to those informed by the disciplines of anthropology, economics, 
gender studies, history, linguistics, literature, philosophy, political science, psychology, rhetoric, 
and sociology., In one British scholar's view, "[s]ociological analysis of law has as its sole unifying 
objective the attempt to remedy the assumed inadequacy of lawyers' doctrinal analyses of law." 
Roger COTIERREll, Law's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (1995), 25. 
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combines analysis of scholarly debates, investigation of empirical data, and 
reflection on legal academic culture from an American perspective. To this 
extent, it exemplifies the best (or worst, depending on one's predilections) 
eclectic tendencies of some socio-Iegal scholarship. 
II. - LEX MERCATORIA AND THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Any argument about the "need" for an empirical approach to the lex 
mercatoria - which term I use as a synonym for "new law merchant" as 
developed in the post-World War" era - presupposes an initial assessment of 
the phenomenon. I do not begin with a legalistic definition of the term, since 
that approach would beg the underlying questions. Rather, I begin by briefly 
surveying the academic debates over lex mercatoria, in order to illuminate the 
contours of this transnational field and to identify the stakes in the often 
heated debates. Insofar as possible, the discussion of substance is integrated 
with that of the contractual, arbitral, and other contexts in which lex 
mercatoria emerges and plays its role. This tack reflects my views on the 
interdependent relationship between these different aspects of the 
phenomenon, as well as the inductive approach endemic to Common Law 
thinking on any legal topic. 
One of the dominant debates about lex mercatoria concerns its nature, in 
particular whether it is an autonomous legal order or not.2 The heated 
academic controversies over this question express fundamental disagreements 
about the characteristics of the legal framework that is - or should be -
available to govern international economic relations, but also refract broader 
jurisprudential and other theoretical concerns. My bird's-eye view of the 
"autonomy" discourse yields two conclusions: first, that different authors use 
the terms "autonomy" (or "autonomous") in significantly different ways; and 
second, that they use the' same concept to address a variety of distinct (albeit 
inextricably related) aspects of the lex mercatoria phenomenon, namely its 
normativity (i.e., origins or sources and contents), on the one hand, and its 
2 My analysis focuses on the broader multidisciplinary debate over autonomy, rather 
than the narrower (but no less important) legal debate. over whether lex mercatoria rises to the 
level of a legal order or system. While I recognize that these issues are linked in the minds of legal 
scholars, insofar as completeness and systematicity are considered prerequisites to autonomous 
status as a legal order, my goal here is not to rehash the legal debates, but rather to examine them 
from a different perspective. My approach only roughly approximates the socio-epistemological 
approach of Nikitas HAlZIMIHAll, The Many Lives - and Faces - of Lex Mercatoria: An Essay on 
the Genealogy of International Business Law (2006 manuscript) (providing a detailed 
historiography of the lex mercatoria literature). 
. .. 
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effectivity (i.e., how and whether it "works" in practice, particularly in 
connection with international commercial arbitration), on the other. The 
essential point to grasp here is that these two aspects of lex mercatoria are 
interdependent .and mutually constitutive.3 Explicit engagement with these 
dimensions of the debate over the autonomy of lex mercatoria might help to 
break the intellectual gridlock in this field. 
With regard to my first conclusion, virtually all authors agree that 
/lautonomy" implies something that is outside the realm of the State, notwith-
standing their often vastly different frames of reference. In particular, some 
authors use the term to mean /lsocietal" (in the sense of referring to extra-legal 
norms), while others use it to mean "transnational" (in the sense of pointing 
beyond the nation-State). Moreover, while all authors depart from the positivist 
notion of the (nation-)State as the only source of law, they differ in regard to 
which societal actors they look to - viz., merchants or the legal profession - as 
sources. Finally, the term "autonomy" is sometimes used to refer narrowly to the 
parties' freedom of contract, while at other times it is deployed more broadly to 
mean the systemic autonomy of lex mercatoria itself. This latter discrepancy 
ranges, in other words, from narrow concern with the liberty of economic actors 
themselves, to a broader concern with the power of the legal profession to 
disencumber economic activity (and hence also legal practice) from substantive 
or procedural interference by the State. 
I turn now to consider the more concrete debates over the two aspects of 
lex mercatoria identified above ~ i.e., its normativity and its effectivity - which 
are both implicated in the autonomy discourse. The following discussion of 
normativity is subdivided into two parts, corresponding to what are labelled 
here as first- and second-order debates. 
In terms of the normativity (i.e., the origins or sources) of lex mercatoria, 
the first-order debate concerns whether the norms arise spontaneously from -
and are thus driven by the functional needs of - the business community ("self-
3 I read De ly's characterization of the lex mercatoria as "a method of judicial and 
arbitral adjudication" as compatible with the perspective that the norms must be seen, indeed can 
only be fully comprehended, in the context of commercial dispute resolution. See Filip DE LY, 
"Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and International Self-regulation", in R.P. 
Appelbaum I Wm. L.F. Felstiner I V. Gessner (Eds.), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of 
Global Business Transactions (2001), 159-188 {180} [hereinafter: Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and 
Networks}. Accord, Emmanuel GAILLARD, NTransnational law: A Legal System or a Method of 
Comparative Decision-Making?", in Klaus Peter Berger (Ed.), The Practice of Transnational Law 
(2001), 53-65 (hereinafter: Berger, The Practice of Transnational Law) (lex mercatoria is a method 
of comparative law reasoning). The view I put forward here is slightly broader than De Ly's 
conception, insofar as it embraces extra-legal as well as legal forms of dispute resolution. 
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regulation"), or whether they arise through the intervention of the State. The first 
position tends to find support among a strange group of bedfellows that can be 
variously characterized as legal pluralists,4 economists,S constructivists,6 
systems theorists,7 and other socia-legal scholars,8 whereas the second position 
is largely the province of legal positivists and traditional private international law 
scholars. It is virtually impossible to disentangle objective from value-based 
perspectives in the context of this debate, since normative considerations are 
thoroughly imbricated in the theoretical presuppositions that animate the 
observers. That ultimate stakes are in play is reflected by the labels "religiOUS 
war" 9 and "trench warfare" 10 that have been used in this context. 
4 See, e.g., Gunther TEUBNER, H 'Global Bukowina': legal Pluralism in a World Society", 
in Gunther Teubner (Ed.), Global Law without a State (1997),3-28. 
5 See, e.g., Robert COOTER, HStructural Adjudication and the New law Merchant: A 
Model of Decentralized law", 14 International Review of Law & Economics (1994), 215-231 (215) 
(a A community of people forms a special network whose members develop relationships with 
each other through repeated interactions. The modern economy creates many specialized 
business communities. ... Wherever there are communities, norms arise to coordinate the 
interaction of people .... I refer to all such norms of business communities as the new law 
merchant. "). 
6 See, e.g., A. Claire CUTLER, Hpublic Meets Private: The International Unification and 
Harmonization of Private International Trade law", 13(1) Global Society (1999), 25-48 (discussing 
the unifying influence exerted by a global"mercatocracy" or merchant class and a global business 
culture); id., aprivate international regimes and interfirm cooperation", in Rodney Bruce Hall I 
Thomas J. Biersteker (Eds.), The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (2002), 23-
40 (35) [hereinafter: Hall I Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority] (asserting that athe 
corporate world wants and is generating private, ad hoc, and discretionary standards''); William 
SCHEUERMAN, "Economic Globalization and the Rule of law", 6(1) Constellations: An International 
Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory (May 1999), 3-25 (arguing that Hboth a unifying 
corporate elite and the compression of time and space are obviating the need for explicit, 
predictable, and fixed rules"). 
7 See, e.g., Mathias ALBERT, Zur Politik der Weltwinschaft (2002). See also Gralf-Peter 
CALLIESS, "Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of 
Private law", 23 Zeitschrift fiir Rechtssoziologie (2002), 185-216 (endorsing Teubner's "reflexive 
law" approach to transnational law, which marks a " 'third way' between market and State: a civil 
society basically regulating itself, supported, if necessary activated, but essentially merely framed 
and supervised by the State," and which constitutes a synthesis of the "descriptive Systems Theory 
of Niklas Luhmann and the normativist Discourse Theory of JOrgen Habermas"). 
8 See, general/y, the contributions in the following edited volumes: Volkmar Gessner / 
Ali Cem Budak (Eds.), Emerging Legal Certainty: Empirical Studies on the Globalization of Law 
(1998) [hereinafter: Gessner / Budak, Emerging Legal Certainty]; Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and 
Networks, supra note 3. 
9 Michael Joachim BONELL; "Die UNIDROIT Prinzipien der internationalen Handels-
vertrage: Eine neue lex Mercatoria?", 37 Zeitschrift {iir Rechtsverg/eichung (1996), 152-157. (152). 
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What often gets lost in the all-or-nothing battle between these opposing 
camps is the possibility that norms might arise through the intervention of 
other civil society groups, such as legal actors.ll Strict adherents to either 
polar position on the autonomy question would assume this problem away, 
by assimilating legal actors either to the business community (sometimes 
referred to as the "community of merchants" or societas mercatorum) or to the 
State, and thus deny them any agency of their own. Yet history, as noted 
below, shows that legal actors have on occasion supported (or opposed) the 
lex mercatoria in the service of their own professional interests. If this third 
alternative is taken into account, then the all-or-nothin"g battle over the 
autonomy of the origin or sources of the lex mercatoria simply cannot be won 
in a fair fight. 12 Indeed, the only way for one argument to prevail over the 
other would be on definitional grounds. Thus, if the narrow definition is 
adopted, according to which lex mercatoria consists only of those norms 
spontaneously generated within the (extra-legal) economic realm to govern its 
own affairs, then lex mercatoria is by definition autonomous or unconstrained 
by the State along this dimension. Conversely, if a broader definition is 
adopted,13 then the lex mercatoria may include positive law (e.g., domestic 
10 Klaus Peter BERGER, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1999), 32 
[hereinafter: BERGER, Creeping Codificatiori1. According to Berger, ibid., at 33, the "intrinsic evil" 
of the lex mercatoria doctrine is that discussions about it are Hfrequently too emotional and too 
passionate. " 
11 As Dasser has aptly put it, II Are we talking about legal rules created by merchants, or 
legal rules created for merchants by academics, legislators and others?": Felix DASSER, "Lex 
Mercatoria - Critical Comments on a Tricky Topic", in Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks, 
supra note 3, at 189-200 (189). 
12 As for the effect of these debates within the business community itself, see DASSER, 
supra note 11, at 191 ("[A]sk almost any businessperson what he or she thinks of the lex 
mercatoria or the autonomous legal order of intemational commerce, and you will earn a blank 
stare."). 
13 Horn, who prefers the broader definition of lex mercatoria, has steered a pragmatic 
course around the quicksand of debates over autonomy. See, e.g., Norbert HORN, HThe Use of 
Transnational Law in the CO[ltract Law of Intemational Trade and Finance", in Berger, The 
Practice of Transnational Law, supra note 3, at 67-80(73-74) [hereinafter: HORN, Transnational 
Law] ("We need not discuss here the controversial question of whether private parties are 
empowered to detach their contract entirely from the application of domestic law. Let us assume, 
instead, that most national laws allow at lea~t a partial reference tointemationally recognized 
rules or to any other set of rules as part of party autonomy."). He knows this to be true, based on 
personal experience, and indeed empirical studies confirm this as fact. See also Norbert HORN, 
IIUniformity and Diversity in the Law of Intemational Commercial Contracts", in Norbert Hom / 
Clive M. Schmitthoff (Eds.), The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions 
(1982), 3 (16) (noting that the existence of de facto similarities of rules found in various legal 
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rules enabling private autonomy; the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)), as well as other norms 
generated or "restated" by legal actors (e.g., the UN/DROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts; the "Lando" Principles of European 
Contract Law; the lists drawn up by various scholars), and is thus not strictly 
autonomous.14 In the end, resolving this dispute at the definitional level is 
impractical, since neither camp would concede the other's definition, and 
would achieve a hollow victory at best. 
The second-order debate about the normativity of lex mercatoria is the 
more practical one concerning its actual content. Obviously the content 
depends on whether one adopts the first (narrow definition) or second (broad 
definition) position identified above, and thus on one's views about the 
recognized sources of lex mercatoria norms. Those who subscribe to the 
narrow view (i.e., that only norms generated by business itself count) face a 
challenge that is theoretically straightforward, but difficult in practice, namely 
to identify such norms as may exist in different commercial branches or 
locales.15 The need for empirical studies in this context is insurmountable, if 
the claim that such norms exist is to be proven.16 A few studies of the 
practices of particular industries have been undertaken to date,17 and others 
systems constitute "a first step towards uniformity; but by no means can we speak here of 
elements of an 'autonomous' law of intemational commerce"). 
14 Berger argues for an intermediate or hybrid position: lex mercatoria is an 
"independent, 'third' supranational legal system between domestic law and public international 
law, a legal system that is created and developed by the law-making forces of the intemational 
business community." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 43. 
15 The legal perspective sharply distinguishes custom and trade usages from law: "Trade 
usages do not have the quality of law. Together with other 'factual legal sources', such as general 
conditions of trade or customs, they constitute the first step towards the development of customary 
law and towards the creation of a lex mercatoria. 'All customary law of international trade has the 
quality of trade usages but not all trade usages are customary law.'" BERGER, Creeping 
Codification, supra note 10, at 41 (quoting Felix DASSER, Internationa/e Schiedsgerichte und Lex 
Mercatoria (1989), 91). 
16 For a general argument supported by empirical evidence about extra-legal ordering 
outside the commercial context, see Robert C. EllICKSON, Order Without Law: How Neighbors 
Settle Disputes (1991) . 
. 17 lisa BERNSTEIN, "Opting Out of the legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Trade", 21 Journal of Legal Studies (1992), 115-157; Klaus FRICK, "Third Cultures 
versus Regulators: Cross-border legal Relations of Banks", in Gessner / Budak, Emerging Legal 
Certainty, supra note 8, at 93-137; Barak D. RICHMAN, "Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and 
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry", Duke Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper, No. 134 (2006); Christine STAMMEl, "Back to the Courtroom? Developments in the london 
Reinsurance Market", in Gessner / Budalv Emerging Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at 61-91. See, 
Uni{. L. Rev. 2007 
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are underway.18 However, the prospect of distilling such universal (legal) 
principles as might exist from the multitude of particular customs, trade usages 
or other practices would be daunting, in the unlikely event that proponents of 
the ·narrow view were to undertake such a task. 
In terms of content, the (primarily legal) scholars who adopt the broader 
definition have an easier job of it, at least insofar as there is widespread 
(though not complete) agreement on the major sources of hard and 50ft lex 
mercatoria norms. Horn identifies three transnational sources of such 
norms:19 international conventions and treaties; semi-official texts that remain 
outside any legislative procedure (e.g., the 1994 UN/DROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, which he identifies as the IImost influen-
tial unofficial source" of lex mercatoria 20); and non-codified principles that 
may be used by lawyers when drafting international commercial and financial 
contracts and are recognized by courts and arbitral tribunals. Horn's list of 
sources raises crucial methodological questions, which can only be touched 
upon here. 
Berger takes up the methodological challenge in his book on the 
"creeping codification" of lex mercatoria, which self-consciously (but 
nonetheless paradoxically) opens with Oliver Wendell Holmes' classic quote 
about the Common law: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience." 21 Accordingly, Berger builds his "open-ended and flexible" 
generally, Volkmar GESSNER! Richard P. ApPELBAUM! William LF. FELSTINER, "Introduction: The 
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions", in Felstiner I Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra 
note 3, at 1-36 [hereinafter: GESSNER! ApPElBAUM/FELSTINER] . 
. 18 One young scholar at the University of Bremen has studied the timber industry in 
search of extra-legal trade norms. See Wioletta KONRADI, "lex Mercatoria Approach to 
Globalization" Oanuary 2006 manuscript}; Idem, "Lex mercatoria als globales Recht der 
Wirtschaft? Die Koordination der Intemationalen Transaktionen am Beispiel der Holzindustrie", 
University of Bremen TranState Working Paper, No. 056/2007, available at 
< httpjlwww.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de>. 
. 19 HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at .67. Horn defines transnational law as "all 
law stemming from or under the influence of transnational sources of law and regulating acts or 
events that transcend national frontiers." Ibid. He acknowledges that narrower definitions of the 
lex mercatoria only include the latter two sources, but argues that it is "advisable ... to follow the 
... broader use of the term, and to also include conventions, because codified and uncodified law 
are closely interrelated .... " Ibid., at 68. See also Clive SCHMITIHOFF, Commercial Law in a 
Changing Economic Climate (1981), 47 et seq. 
20 HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at 74. 
21 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at xiii. Berger is doubly paradoxical, in 
that he combines the pragmatic and realist orientations of a lawyer and experienced arbitrator 
with a strong commitment to lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal order. See, generally, ibid., at 
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compilation or "restatement" of the "Principles, Rules and Standards of the 
Lex Mercatoria" 22 on the foundational assumption that lex mercatoria is an 
"autonomous legal system" that is "coming into being by way of 
decentralized, 'spontaneous' law-making" in a dialectical way through the 
"interaction between commercial practice and the law." 23 Moreover, inspired 
by Eugen Ehrlich's notion of the "living law", Berger argues further that the 
search for legal rules and principles within this legal system 24 "may not be 
reduced to a mere logical deduction from a predetermined normative 
system," 25 but must occur within an "unwritten framework of values and 
convictions providing and enriching it with the necessary logical consistency 
and internal unity." 26 In the end, Berger's inductive and comparative legal 
32-113. A reviewer has described one of Berger's books as "part introduction, part manifesto." 
Nikitas HATZIMIHAIL, /lBook Review of Berger, The Practice of Transnational Law", 70(4) Rabels 
Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationa/es Privatrecht (2006), 823-826. It bears mention, 
however, that Berger's commitment to the autonomy of the lex mercatoria must be distinguished 
from that of the purists who would only look to extra-legal business norms, and not to norms 
ascertained through the interventions of legal actors. 
22 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, Annex I, at 278-311. Although Berger's 
"List of Principles, Rules and Standards of the Lex Mercatoria" frequently cites international and 
domestic hard laws, he stresses that such rules merely "serve as an indication that a common 
understanding of the subject matters of these rules and principles exists in all major legal systems", 
which, in tum, may /lultimately lead to the development of general principles which become part 
of the autonomous world trade law." Ibid., at 39. 
23 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 112-113. In Berger's view, "economy 
and law ... are not regarded as antipodes but as complementary elements which in their combined 
effect and through the law-making force of the parties' contractual consensus create commercial 
law." Ibid., at 113. In this regard, Berger's argument bears some resemblance to Teubner's 
discussion of Luhmann's notion of "structural coupling". See Gunther TEUBNER,"Breaking Frames: 
Economic Globalization and the Emergence of Lex Mercatoria", 5(2) European Journal of Social 
Theory (2002), 199-217 (207) (recognizing /lother types of social rule production as law 
production, but only under the condition that they are produced in the periphery of the legal 
system in structural coupling with external social processes of rule-formation. "). 
24 The lex mercatoria is systematic insofar as the individual rules or principles exist 
"within a teleological framework that is formed by logical and grammatical rules leading to the 
grouping and coordination of legal institutions," and that provides "the necessary framework not 
only for the application of the law to individual cases but also for the evolution and refinement of 
this legal system as a 'law in action'." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91. 
25 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91 (citing Norbert HORN, ·Zur 
Bedeutung der Topiklehre Theodor Viehwegs fur eine einheitliche Theorie des juristischen 
Denkens", 21 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1967), 601 (602». Moreover, Berger (ibid., at 93) 
rejects the insistence that a legal system must have an "axiomatic self-contained character" as "a 
positivist myth" (citing Eugen EHRLICH, Grundlegungder Soziologie des Rechts (1913, 1929), 345, 
and Karsten SCHMIDT, Die Zukunft der Kodifikationsidee (1985),19). 
26 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 91-92. In this respec~ Berger argues 
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method for ascertaining the content of the lex mercatoria is one that warms 
the Common Law heart, while his invocation of Ehrlich's "living law" tradition 
bolsters my claim that empirical studies have an important role to play in this 
transnational legal field. However, I caution against conflating the inductive 
Common Law methodology, as a technique for distilling doctrines (i.e., prin-
ciples and rules) from what courts and arbitral tribunals have done, with the 
broader socio-Iegal preoccupation about "law in action", which is only 
incidentally concerned with such doctrinal matters.27 Ehrlich's "living law" 
and the Common Law have strong affinities for one another, and can be 
productively combined, as Berger's approach suggests, but they are far from 
identical. 
In terms of the effectivity of the lex mercatoria (i.e., how and whether it 
"works" in the context of dispute resolution), the debates over autonomy take 
on a less heated, albeit no less significant character. Indeed, from a practical 
perspective, the ultimate answer to the question of autonomy depends on 
whether the State yields to privatized forms of dispute resolution - whether 
legal or extra-legal - or insists on imposing itself upon the parties to a 
commercial transaction.28 This is the quintessential lawyers' realm, in which 
debates over party autonomy are a proxy war for the struggle between 
national jurisdiction and a-national (or denationalized 29) dispute resolution. 
The crucial questions here are two-fold and pertain to applicable law: first, 
whether parties are free to choose something other than positive (i.e., national 
or international) law, such as lex mercatoria norms or ex aqueo et bono 
that lithe reference to unwritten general principles of law has today to a large extent replaced 
positivistic approaches to decision-making, thereby introducing a new pluralism into the classical 
and largely positivistic theory of legal sources." Ibid., at 92. 
27 As a consequence of this difference, Berger's use of the term "law in action" is quite 
different from my own understanding and usage of that term, as elaborated in note 40 infra. 
28 "[MJarket authority does not simply supplant sovereign (public) authority"; rather, 
I/sovereign authority accommodates the burgeoning demands for market authority by participating 
in its own transformation." Thomas J. BIERSTEKER / Rodney Bruce HAll, "Private authority as global 
governance", in Hall! Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority, supra note 6, at 203-222 
(209). See, generally, Dieter MA~TINY, "Traditional Private and Commercial Law Rules under the 
Pressure of Global Transactions: The Role for an International Order", in Felstiner I Gessner, Rules 
and Networks, supra note 3, at 123-155. 
29 See Michael ZORN, "Sovereignty and Law in a Denationalised World", in Felstiner! 
Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note 3, at 39"71 (40) (preferring the term "societal 
denationalisation" to I/globalisation"). See also DE LY, supra note 3, at 167 (asking "whether 
globalisation actually is occurring or whether we see much more denationalisation and regional 
forms of internationalisation."). 
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resolution of their dispute, to govern their relationship;30 and second, whether 
they may opt out (and thus evade the application) of distasteful provisions of the 
otherwise applicable positive law(s). Most legal scholars accept that the lex 
mercatoria must either yield to 31 or otherwise accommodate "the socio-
economic values and policy decisions which stand behind mandatory provis-
ions of domestic law [having1 an ordre public-quality," 32 but not all do so,33 
Some empirical studies have looked at what parties (and their lawyers) actually 
do in their transnational contracts,34 but more work along these lines is needed. 
30 "Schmitthoff said in 1964 that lex mercatoria applies if and so far as allowed by the 
national laws." HORN, Transnational Law, supra note 13, at 80. 
31 For arguments that internationally mandatory provisions of law retain their character as 
legal. "trumps" and should be applied even in the arbitral context, see Ulrich DROBNIG, 
"Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und wirtschaftliche Eingriffsnormen", in Festschrift· Kegel 
(1987), 95; Jan SCHIFFER, Normen aus/andischen Hoffent/ichen" Rechts in internationalen 
Handelsschiedsverfahren (1990), 44ff. See also, A. BARRACLOUGH / J. WAINCYMER, "Mandatory 
Rules of law in International Commercial Arbitration", 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 
(2005), 205; D. HOCHSTRASSER, "Choice of law and 'Foreign' Mandatory Rules in International 
Arbitration", 11 Journal of International Arbitration (1994), 57; A.S. RAu, "The Arbitrator and 
Mandatory Rules of law," American Review of International Arbitration (Spring 2008); N. VOSER, 
"Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial 
Arbitration", 7 American Review of International Arbitration (1996), 319. 
32 BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 10, at 75. Berger himself does not subscribe 
to this widely-accepted view, however. 
33 Consistent with his role as one of the leading legal proponents of the idealistic view 
that lex mercatoria is an autonomous legal order, Berger argues that scholars who insist on 
preserving "the general notion of ordre public inherent in any domestic legal system '" 
misunderstand the true quality of the lex mercatoria." BERGER, Creeping Codification, supra note 
10, at 76. In lieu of the traditional (nation}-State-based notion of ordre public, he argues instead 
that lex mercatoria should be "supplemented by the creation of an a-national, i.e. transnational 
ordre public" based on the existing "uniform ethical understanding in international commercial 
affairs," which in his view is evidenced by the IImass of ethical and moral rules and principles" 
found in lithe various Codes of Conduct drafted by international organizations." Ibid., at 77. 
34 See, e.g., Klaus Peter BERGER / Holger DUBBE~STEIN / Sascha LEHMANN / Victoria 
PETZOLD, "The CENTRAL Enquiry on the Use of Transnational Law in International Contract Law 
and Arbitration: Background, Procedure and Selection", 9 Mealey's International Arbitration 
Report (2000), 15, available at <http://www.tldb.de> (Transnational law Database), also 
available in German, at 101 Zeitschrift fUr vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft(2002), 12-37; 
Stephen R. BOND, "How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), 1 (2) ICC Bulletin (1990),14; DE 
lv, supra note 3, at 172-173 (surnmarizing empirical evidence regarding the frequency and means 
of application of contract clauses, general conditions, standard terms, self-regulatory rules,usages 
and custom in international trade); Christopher R. DRAHOZAL, IICommercial Norms, Commercial 
Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration", 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(2000),79-146; Barton S. SELDEN, "lex Mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to 
Take a Closer Look", 2 Golden Gate University Annual Survey of International & Comparative 
Living La Vloa Lex lVIelLdlulld 
The ultimate test of autonomy, at least from a legalistic perspective, is 
wRat arbitral tribunals and courts do in particular cases. No legal scholar 
would argue that arbitration itself is fully autonomous, given the role of 
national courts in enforcing arbitration agreements and awards (e.g., under the 
1958 "NeW York" Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards), as well as their ancillary (but nonetheless important) 
procedural roles in the context of international commercial arbitration. Here, 
too, some empirical studies eXist,35 but further "law in action" studies would 
be welcome, both to fill in the lacuna in our knowledge about how lex 
mercatoria works on the ground, and to provide a basis for resolving the 
perennial theoretical debates,36 
Numerous scholars 37 have noted with regret that empirical studies are 
Law (1995), 111 (114, 119) (reporting, on the basis of an informal survey, that most practicing 
lawyers strongly preferred stipulating "definitive" and "provable" laws to an explicit choice of lex 
mercatoria); UNIDROIT (Ed.), The Use of the UN/DRO/T Principles in Practice: Results of the First 
Inquiry Undertaken by the Secretariat of UN/DRO/T (1997). 
35 In addition to the works cited supra in note 34, some of which look at court or arbitral 
practices in addition to contract practices, see also DASSER, supra note 11, at 188-200 
(summarizing thqt author's prior empirical work); Christopher R. Drahozal / Richard W. Naimark 
(Eds.), Towards a Science of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research (2005); 
Stephanie E. KEER / Richard W. NAIMARK, "Arbitrators Do Not Split-the-Baby: Empirical Evidence 
from International Business Arbitrations", 18(5) Kluwer Journal of International Arbitration (Aug. 
2001); Richard W. NAIMARKI Stephanie E. KEER,"Analysis of UNCITRAL Questionnaires on Interim 
ReHef", 3 Mealey's International Arbitration Report (2001); Richard W. NAIMARK I Stephanie E. 
KEER, "Intemational Private Commercial Arbitration - Expectations and Perceptions of Attomeys 
and Business People: A Forced-Rank Analysis", 30 International Business Lawyer (May 2002), 203-
209; Randall PEERENBOOM, "Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the PRC", 49 American Journal of Comparative Law (2001),249-327. 
36 To suggest just one example, it would be useful to know more about arbitral and court 
practice in regard to intemationally mandatory norms; since this would provide a strong indicator 
of the measure of arbitral autonomy, regardless of whether the award was rendered on the basis of 
national or denationalized norms. This question has important policy implications, as suggested 
by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 
U.S. 614 (1985), which allowed claims based on U.S. antitrust laws to be submitted to arbitration. I 
have personal knowledge of one case in which claims based on an expressly (and internationally) 
mandatory domestic u.s. law were ignored by an international arbitral tribunal sitting outside the 
U.s., with the consequence that a distributor who should have been protected against 
unscrupulous conduct by its supplier was denied an opportunity to assert such claims, and 
ultimately went bankrupt. 
37 See, e.g., DE Lv, supra note 3, at 173; GESSNER/ ApPELBAUM/ FELSTINER, supra note 17,at 
28 (noting the "almost complete lack of communication" between legal and social-scientific 
discourses on global transactions, and issuing an urgent plea for interdisciplinary research in this 
field of study); MARTINY, supra note 28, at 124-125. 
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few and far between in the transnational legal field.38 Yet the available 
literature, while spotty, offers ample food for thought. Here I wish to identify 
two types of studies, mention a few examples, and then consider the broader 
implications of their findings.39 The first type of empirical approach identifies 
a gap between "law in the books" (i.e., "black letter" or doctrinal law) and 
"law in action" (i.e., examining whether, and if so how the existing rules are 
deployed in practice).40 This approach is exemplified by two studies 
conducted in the United States, both of which found that the CISG was 
virtually unknown to courts and practitioners ten years after it had become the 
law of the land.41 
The second type of empirical study points to a different kind of gap -
one between "law in academic books" and "law in action". Three studies of 
this sort point toward similar conclusions. The first study was conducted by 
Dasser, who researched arbitral awards to find out whether lex mercatoria 
was actually being used to resolve cases. Dasser's study revealed that "most of 
the awards do not really apply international trade usage, that is, rules created 
38 In addition to the studies cited supra in notes 34 and 35, see also Yves DEZALAY I 
Bryant G. GARTH, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of 
a Transnational Legal Order (1996); Christopher R. DRAHOZAL, "Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A 
Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration", 20(1) Journal of 
International Arbitration (Feb. 2003), 23-34. 
39 Given space limits, I do not evaluate the sufficiency of the empirical evidence upon 
which the cited conclusions rest. The authors of one of the cited studies admit that their con-
clusion is based on scant empirical evidence. GESSNER/ ApPELBAUM/ FELSTINER, supra note 17, at 28. 
40 This definition points up the key difference between my socio-Iegal use of the term 
"law in action" and Berger's useof the same term, as already noted supra in note 27. Ehrlich's 
innovation was to reach outside the formal system of law, especially as found in the Continental 
codes, in order to discover the operative rules of conduct prevailing in various sectors of society. 
From my perspective, Berger's pluralist approach is an application of Common Law methods in a 
transnational context to ascertain what the rules are, given the assumption that there are no (or at 
least too few) "laws on the books". I do not equate the inductive work of examining judicial or 
arbitral deciSions, in order to ascertain -the legal principles articulated there, with "empirical" 
studies of law in the socio-Iegal sense. Rather, in the u.s. context, "law in action" or empirical 
approaches to the study of law include virtually everything but doctrinal approaches. See, 
generally, Volkmar GESSNER, "Globalization and Legal Certainty", in Gessner / Budak, Emerging 
Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at 427-450; Stewart Macaulay / Lawrence M. Friedman I Elizabeth 
Mertz (Eds.), Law in Action: A Socio-Legal Reader (2007). 
41 James E. BAILEY, "Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Lawof International Sales", 32 Cornell 
Journal of International Law (1999), 273. See also Michael GORDON, 46 American Journal of 
Comparative Law (1998), 361-378 (observing the limited extent to which the Clse and UNIDROIT 
Principles had penetrated the legal consciousness and culture of Florida). 
I In;£. L Rev. 2007 
-- --------
------
by merchants, but rather some general principle of law which is more an 
amalgamation of national laws or a fancy word for the arbitrator's subjective 
sense of justice. In other words, [he1 found very few traces of a lex mercatoria 
in its original sense." 42 These findings led Dasser to the following 
conclusions: "First, at least in arbitral practice, a lex mercatoria as something 
akin to an independent legal order does exist, but plays a marginal role. 
Secondly, most relevant national legal systems do not second-guess an 
arbitrator's application of a non-national legal standard." 43 Along similar 
lines, a second study of the legal culture of global business transactions has 
concluded that the "lex mercatoria, at least at the present time, seems to have 
far greater significance in the minds of legal scholars and sociologists of law 
than it does for the merchants themselves." 44 Last but not least, the CENTRAL 
study, which provides a broad set of statistically significant findings based on 
evaluation of more than 700 usable survey instruments, reaches a similar 
conclusion.45 
In the end, both of the foregoing sets of empirical "gap" findings appear 
to deal with apples and oranges, but this appearance is deceptive. Taken 
together, these findings raise important questions about the transnational legal 
field. The existence of gaps as such is hardly news. Indeed, investigating the 
causes and consequences of gaps between what law claims to be and how it 
operates in practice is a staple in the socio-Iegal toolkit. Whether this research 
approach is deployed to gain knowledge for its own sake, or in the service of 
particular reform or policy goals, my basic point remains the same. Neither 
basic knowledge can be gained, nor legal reform or other policy aims soundly 
served, without understanding what is happening on the ground, and why. 
The first set of conclusions about the ClSG pertain to the relative 
ignorance that prevails in a particular country about binding provisions of law. 
42 DASSER, supra note 11, at 196. He updated his original 1980s study and concludes that 
what he discovered then still holds true. Ibid., at 198. 
43 Ibid., at 198. In Dasser's view, "the lex mercatoria is a fascinating toy. However, for 
businesspeople and their lawyers it is largely irrelevant, apart from the humble (but very 
important) trade usages. But then, ... the latter are completely different and should be called by 
their traditional name in order to avoid misunderstandings." Ibid., at 198-199. See also Felix 
DASSER, U 'Lex Mercatoria', Werkzeug der Praktiker oder Spielzeug der Lehre?", 1 Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift far intemationa/es und europaisches Recht (1991),299-323. 
44 GESSNER I APPELBAUM I FELSTINER, supra note 17, at 18. 
45 BERGER et a/., supra note 34 (noting the existence of a Usubstantial gap between the 
assumptions of lawyers who discuss the theory of transnational commercial law and the 
assumptions and viewpoints of internatioriallegal practice.'1. 
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As such, these findings simultaneously explain 46 and raise questions about 
how to close the sizeable gap in a given setting. They also raise questions 
about the role of lawyers and judges in the transnational legal field. The 
second set of conclusions, which pertain to the academic-practice gap and 
raise further questions about the about the role of legal academics in the 
transnational legal field, are more ambiguous in terms of their policy impli-
cations. Thus, all of the studies noted above, despite being fundamentally 
different in their particulars, are linked via their broader implications, which 
draw attention to particular knowledge deficiencies and to the central role of 
legal actors in constructing the transnational legal field. 
For those committed to closing the "ignorance" gap about the ClSG (or 
other transnational norms), the most obvious solution is to spread the word . 
. Information has become readily available through the World Wide Web, but 
even assuming ready access - which cannot safely be assumed in all countries 
where the CISG has been adopted - lawyers and dispute resolvers must first 
conceive of the idea of searching for norms originating outside their domestic 
legal order, if they are ever to find the extensive resources now available on-
line.47 In fact, the perceived need to disseminate information about inter-
national uniform law has been on the agenda of international organizations, 
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) that produced the CISG, as well as of professional organizations 
concerned with matters of public and private international law,48 since long 
46 Widespread ignorance regarding the existence of the CISG offers at best a partial 
explanation for the relative paucity of published U.S. judicial or arbitral decisions applying its 
provisions. Numerous alternative explanations can be imagined, such as the widespread 
"common wisdoms" that many, if not most American lawyers advise their clients to opt out of the 
ClSG, or that merchants simply prefer arbitration. Other conceivable explanations might draw on 
the host of factors that are relevant to a decision whether or not to pursue a wrong by means of 
legal process. With regard to the latter point, albeit in a domestic rather than a transnational 
context, see William FELSTINER I Richard L. ABEl I Austin SARAT, "The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... ", 15 Law & Society Review (1980), 
631; Stewart MACAULAY, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study", 28 
American Sociological Review (1963), 55. 
47 See, e.g., CENTRAL Database, available at < http:www.tldb.de>; ClSG Database, Pace 
Institute· for International Commercial law, available at < http://www.cisg.law.pace. 
edu> (including a link to the "Autonomous Network of ClSG Websites"); International Trade law 
Monitor, available at <http://www.jus.uio.no/lm> (public-private project of Norwegian 
universities and Cameron May ltd.); UNCITRAl Website, available at 
<http://www.uncitral.org>; UNIDROIT Website, available at <http://www.unidroit.org>; Unilex 
Website, available at <http://www.unilex.org> (CiSG & UNIDROIT Principles). 
48 For example, the goal of informing practicing laWyers and judges about the ClSG and 
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before the advent of the Internet. To take one fateful example, this topic was 
on the agenda at the 1992 UNCITRAl Colloquium on Uniform Commercial 
law in the Twenty-First Century, where New York attorney, Michael Sher, 
suggested organizing a moot competition, in which students would work on a 
case that was governed by the ClSG and presented in an arbitral forum.49 This 
proposal led quickly to the creation of the Willem C. Vis International 
Commercial Arbitration Moot, which is discussed in Part III below. 
As for the academic-practice knowledge gap, different conclusions may 
be drawn. The first is that more and better empirical studies are desirable to 
bring theory into line with actual conditions. However, this is true only insofar 
as scholars are motivated by a scientific, inquiring spirit, rather than by 
normative considerations or other interests. Mention has already been made 
of the fact that debates over lex mercatoria have "religious" overtones, which 
implies that they are, at least in some cases, rooted in belief or ideology, and 
thus tantamount to tenets of faith.50 Such strong commitments seem to be the 
exception rather than the rule, and are commonly tempered by healthy doses 
of pragmatism,51 as well as by increasing acceptance among traditional legal 
other uniform law, as well as other private international law issues, has been a frequent topic of 
discussion within the Private International Law Committee of the American Bar Association 
Section of Intemationallaw, which I chaired from 1989-1992, as well as the Private International 
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law, which I chaired from 1999-2003. 
49 Intervention of Michael J. SHER, Uniform Commercial Law in the Twenty-First Century: 
Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, New 
York, 18-22 May 1992, UN Sales No. E.94.V.14, (1995), 94-103 (101). 
50 One commentator, for example, has characterized Berger's work as embodying a 
"concrete ideological commitment." HATZlMIHAIL, supra note 21. For his part, Goldman - the 
modern progenitor of the view of lex mercatoria as an autonomous legal system - held the view 
that lex mercatoria was based on natural law. Berthold GOLDMAN, "Arbitrage international et droit 
commun des nations", Revue de ['arbitrage (1956), 115-116. For an extreme example, see Harold 
J. BERMAN, "World Law: An Ecumenical Jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit", Emory Public Law 
Research Paper, No. 05-4 (February 2005) (proposing a jurisprudence of the emerging "world law" 
- which the author defines to include Nmany aspects· of world economic law" - that would 
"reflect the image of the tri-une God" and re-integrate the Htraditional schools of positivism, 
stressing will (the policies of the lawmaker), natural law stressing reason (moral values inherent in 
human nature), and the historical school stressing group memory (community traditions)"). For a 
more skeptical view, see DE lv, supra note 3, at 167 (expressing doubts about universalistic 
notions predicated on "rationalism as a unifying factor" and describing this "conception [as] overly 
ambitious, irrealistic and naive"), and at 168 (noting that this approach "hides value judgement 
about what is desirable in international trade where different cultures may provide different 
answers"). 
51 According to DE Lv, supra note 3, at 166, the "most important development in the 
1990s is that the debate is to a certain extent not reduced to religion with believers and non-
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scholars and practitioners of the need for empirical studies. Yet the "let's get 
on with it" orientation that has taken hold among some contemporary scholars 
should not detract from the bottom line, which is that the professional 
interests of legal actors have played a key role in the emergence of and 
(relative) autonomy achieved within the transnational legal field. Indeed, 
historical 52 and sOciological 53 studies demonstrate that legal professionals 
occasionally mobilize doctrinal arguments in a rhetorical way, in order to 
achieve ends that are beneficial to themselves. Thus, the second gap identified 
above also suggests a second possible conclusion, namely that the lex 
mercatoria is a professional project - a constructed legal field in which 
developments emerge "as a product of competition and conflict" 54 - and not 
just an automatic process driven by the inevitabilities of the market or the 
needs of commerce. 
By drawing attention to the agency of legal actors in this transnational 
field, I do not wish to denigrate their painstaking efforts or heroic quest to 
develop the lex mercatoria. Rather, my aim is to suggest that their agency 
raises questions that are crucial to the continuing debate over the autonomous 
character of the lex mercatoria, as well as to a broader understanding of the 
role of legal actors in transnational governance, and thus deserving of further 
believers but acknowledges somewhat more that the lex mercatoria - as conceived by Goldman 
as an autonomous legal system - is here to stay as a fact of life and that the question is more about 
the conditions and circumstances under which it should be applied." See also BERGER, Creeping 
Codification, supra note 10, at 32-33 (bemoaning the fact that the "antimony of viewpoints" over 
the lex mercatoria has brought the "discussion on a progressive evolution of transnational 
commercial law .. , to a halt."). 
52 See, e.g., Stephen E. SACHS, "From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of 
the Medieval 'Law Merchant' ", 21 (5) American University International Law Review (2006), 685. 
Sachs argues that the universalization of the law merchant in England in the seventeenth century 
was a rhetorical tool deployed in the battle between civilians and common lawyers over 
jurisdiction in commercial cases, in which the Common Law courts ultimately prevailed over 
Chancery. In that context, the civilians argued that mercantile law was separate from the law of 
the land, because it was part of a transnational tradition, and thus should be retained in separate 
courts staffed by the civilian lawyers. Ibid., at 795-801. Sachs' account challenges the received 
" 'Romantic' vision of a universal law merchant - produced, interpreted, and enforced by a 
legally autonomous merchant class .... ." Ibid., at 688. Rather, he argues, the "Romantic 
interpretation is deeply inaccurate, at leastas applied to the experience of medieval England, and 
provides a prime example of the misuse of historical evidence in support of political ends." Ibid., 
at 690. 
53 See, e.g., DEZALAY I GARTH, supra note 38 (arguing that the lex mercatoria was created 
by an intellectual elite as a means of carving out a market niche for arbitration services and 
reducing competition from members of the local bar). 
54 Pierre BORDIEU, "Foreword", in DEZALAY I GARTH,supra note 38, at vii-x (vii). 
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study. Of course, these are not the only questions that merit sustained 
attention. 
The extant body of empirical work, which has only been touched upon 
above, is beset with methodological weaknesses 55 and full of holes.56 Some 
results are unclear or contradictory, while others suffer from insufficient 
attention to research design (e.g., unfocused research questions; mismatch 
between theory and method) or inadequate presentation of results. Moreover, 
given the diverse theoretical approaches and the heterogeneous scopes of the 
respective studies themselves, it is difficult (if not impossible) at this stage to 
cumulate results, though some patterns (such as the modest ones identified 
above) are visible. To some degree, these problems are endemic in a young 
field of empirical inquiry. However, greater attention to such matters could 
bring substantial rewards. There is, in addition, a gulf between studies that 
look at business practices and those that look at legal practices. This gulf 
could be bridged by collaborative work aimed at integrating these 
perspectives. Indeed, such work is necessary to adjudicate theoretical claims 
over the autonomy of the lex mercatoria. Another problem is that only a few 
cultures and branches of trade have been studied thus far. This is a glaring 
weakness in a transnational field, where a healthy skepticism towards 
universalist 57 claims demands the broadest possible approach to the topic of 
the role of law in transnational commercial life. 58 Finally, while the pragmatic 
turn noted above may signal that the "religious wars" over lex mercatoria are 
over for now, its future remains nonetheless an open book. And this book is 
being written to a significant degree in Vienna, as explained in the next Part of 
this essay. 
55 While a detailed analysis of methodological problems is beyond the scope of this 
essay, two key problems warrant mention: first, insufficient sample size, and second, sample bias 
(or lack of representativeness, such as in geographical terms or in terms of the types of legal and 
other actors surveyed). 
56 For a broad assessment of the weaknesses of existing empirical research on lex 
mercatoria, see Wioletta KONRADI / Hector FIX-FIERRO, HLex mercatoria in the mirror of empirical 
research", 2-3 Socio/ogia del Diritto (2005),23. 
57 DE Lv, supra note 3, at 167; see also N. JIN, liThe Status of Lex Mercatoria in 
International Commercial Arbitration", 7 American Review of International Arbitration (1996),181 
(attacking the universalist aspirations of the lex mercatoria from a developing country perspective, 
on the basis that these countries have not agreed to the rules and were not involved in their 
formation). 
58 See, e.g., the studies of Guanxi in Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note 
3, at 325-420. 
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III. -THE WILLEM C. VIS INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT (VIS MOOT) 
Since its conception in 1992, the Vis Moot has rapidly become a central event 
in fa vida lex mercatoria. During my Cologne years, I had the good fortune to 
collaborate with numerous colleagues and students at the Rechtszentrum fur 
europfiische und internationa!e Zusammenarbeit (R.l.l.), which inter alia 
provided high-quality international training for students, particularly via its 
support for University of Cologne student participation in the Vis Moot since 
1995. The R.l.l.'s far-reaching commitment to skills-oriented legal training put 
it at the leading edge of a revolution in German legal education that appears 
still to be in its infancy.59 But the Vis Moot, which began as a method for 
teaching the next generation of lawyers about the CISG and international 
commercial arbitration, has become much more. While still first and foremost 
an event organized for the students who take part in the competition, the 
Moot has also become a social practice that contributes to the development of 
lex mercatoria (broadly defined). As such, the Vis Moot - now in its fifteenth 
season - is a phenomenon worth taking seriously in socio-Iegal terms, not just 
because of its sheer magnitude, but also because of its role in reproducing the 
transnational legal field. 
Compared to the lex mercatoria, the Vis Moot is neither controversial nor 
shrouded in medieval or early modern history. Indeed, the Moot has barely 
been noticed 60 in the voluminous academic literature about transnational 
law, presumably owing to the dubious assumption that nothing important 
could happen ata student competition. I hope here to take a first step towards 
correcting this misconception. 
The sheer number of participants in the Vis Moot is daunting for the 
Vienna-based organizers. From the intimate group of 11 teams that competed 
in the first Moot in 1993-1994,61 the roster has risen steadily to 178 teams 
participating at the fourteenth Moot in 2006-2007. All together, more than 
1270 teams drawn from 281 universities in 61 countries (counting Kosovo, 
59 For an overview of recent changes in German legal education, see Laurel 5. TERRY, 
"Living with the Bologna Process: Recommendations to the German Legal Education Community 
from a u.s. PerSpective", 7 German Law Journal No. 11 (1 November 2006). 
60 Bergsten has provided an authoritative overview of the first ten years' experience of the 
Vis Moot. 5eeEric E. BERGSTEN, "Ten Years of th~ Willem C. Vis Intemational Commercial 
Arbitration Moot", [2003] International Arbitration Law Review, 37-42. My modest additions to the 
foundation Bergsten already laid are based on data that he kindly provided, which I gratefully 
acknowledge. 
61 I had the privilege of coaching the team from Eotvos Lorand T udomanyegytem (EL TE 
University) in Budapest (Hungary) at the first Vis Moot. 
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Montenegro and Taiwan) had participated in the Vienna-based Moot by 
2007.62 Many institutions have sent teams to Vienna from some countries -
e;g., from Australia (13), Canada (9), P.R. China: (9), France (10), Germany (25), 
India (19), Mexico (8), Switzerland (7), Turkey (7), the United Kingdom (16), 
and the United States (60) - whereas Virtually aI/law schools from some other 
countries have been represented at the Moot. The rate of participation among 
the 281 participating institutions varies. Very few of them have participated in 
all 14 Moots. Indeed, as of 2007,41 % of the schools had only attended once 
(27%) or twice (14%), and the vast majority (74%) had attended fewer than 
half of the Moots. Of the remaining 26% that have participated in at least half 
(i.e., seven or more) of the Vienna-based Moots, roughly half of those 
institutions are located in Europe, and the other half are located elsewhere.63 
Expense is surely a significant factor in each institution's decision whether 
to participate in the Moot, and how often. Still, slightly more than half of the 
over 1270 teams that participated in the Moot during its first fourteen years 
travelled to Vienna from outside Europe. All together, approximately 5.3 % of 
the teams participating in the first 14 Vienna-based Moots came from India, 
5.4% from Central and Latin America (including Mexico), 5.7% from Asia, 7% 
from Australia and New Zealand, and 28% from Canada and the u.s. Not 
62 The thirteenth (2005-2006) and fourteenth (2006-2007) Vis Moots saw a dramatic 
increase in the number of participating countries (from 51 in 2005 to an overall total of 61 in 2007, 
or a 16% jump), as well as in new universities participating (from 229 in 2005 to 281 by 2007, or 
an 18% jump). The new countries joining the Moot since 2005 are: Azerbaijan, EI Salvador, 
Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Malaysia, Montenegro, Portugal, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. Among the 
52 new participating universities since 2005 are a few surprises, among them Sciences Po (France), 
the "social sciences university in the heart of Paris." 
63 In recent years, a "sister" competition - the HVis (East) Moot" - has sprung up in Hong 
Kong, in part to-facilitate participation by a broader range of teams. Since 2003-2004, the Vis (East) 
Moot has been conducted parallel to each year's main Vis Moot in Vienna. The problem and rules 
used in Hong Kong are virtually identical to those used in Vienna, although the schedule is slightly 
different, in part to accommodate those who wish to participate in both Moots. The Vis (East) 
Moot, like the original Vienna-based Moot, has experienced rapid growth since its inception. The 
first Vis (East) Moot (2003-2004) involved 14 teams from six different countries, and the fourth 
(2006-2007) involved 46 teams from 14 different countries. As might be expected, the Vis (East) 
Moot attracts a relatively high percentage of participation from Asian countries, ranging from 86% 
in the first Vis (East) Moot (including Australia, or 71 % excluding Australia), to 54% in 2006-2007 
(including Australia,or 41 % excluding Australia). The Vis (East) Moot has been regularly attended 
by teams from China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Thailand, and in 2006-2007 was joined for the 
first time by a team from South Korea. The declining percentage of Asian participation in the Vis 
(East) Moot reflects growing participation in the Vis (East) Moot by teams from Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere (Brazil, Canada and the U.S.). Further information about the Vis (East) Moot is 
available at < http://www.cisgmootorg>. 
Rev. dr. unif. 2007 751 
! 
! ' 
i, 
Helen E. Hartnell 
surprisingly, the bulk of the teams have come from Europe (48.5% including· 
Turkey). A substantial number (11.6%) of all teams that participated in the 
Moot by 2007 came from former East Bloc countries, and 14% of the teams 
came from Germany alone. 
Yet despite this remarkably broad distribution, participation in the Vis 
Moot remains unrepresentative of the global community. Africa is sorely 
underrepresented at the Vis Moot. In fourteen years, only one team has come 
from Nigeria, and six from South Africa. Moreover, Arab countries and the 
Middle East are virtually absent from this event, although predominantly 
Muslim countries in other parts of the world - Azerbaijan, Indonesia, KOSOVOi 
Malaysia, and Turkey - have been participating in the Vienna-based Moot in 
small but growing numbers (all together 2.4 % of the total number of teams). 
All participating teams converge on Vienna each spring,64 in order to 
present their claims (consisting of at least four arguments per team) before a 
tribunal consisting of three arbitrators. While no aggregate numbers of student 
participants are publicly available, most teams have at least two members, and 
some teams consist of ten and more students, not to mention the (sometimes 
numerous) coaches who accompany their teams to Vienna. Former team 
members often become coaches in later years, and work either with or 
without supervision by faculty members or more experienced lawyers. As of 
the tenth Moot in 2002-2003, more than 3,600 students had participated in the 
Vis Moot, of whom many have gone on to join the Moot Alumni Association 
(MAA) that was founded by a group of student participants after the third Moot 
in 1995-1996. The MAA, which began by organizing social events for student 
participants during the week in Vienna, has added significant professional 
activities to its remit, such as publishing a professional journal (Vindobona 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration) and making use of 
its U.N. Observer status to participate in meetings of UNCITRAL and its 
working groups. 
The Vis Moot also attracts significant professional resources. First, 
hundreds of legal professionals devote their time and talent to the Moot, 
whether as coaches, evaluators of the students' written submissions, 
arbitrators judging the student's performance in the oral competition, or all of 
64 In fact, for some teams, the pleading component of the Moot starts earlier, at 
informally-arranged pre-Vienna practice rounds organized at various European (and possibly also 
at non-European) law schools. These informal pre-Moot rounds are attended by Moot teams from 
numerous European and non-European universities. In addition, many Moot teams have the 
opportunity to practice their pleadings at law firms or in other professional settings before they 
arrive in Vienna. 
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the above. Approximately 300 persons served in one or the other evaluative 
capacity (or both) at the twelfth Moot in 2004-2005. The fact that, for some 
participants, the Moot is a tax-deductible - and possibly even an all-expenses-
paid - trip to Vienna during the opera season, is nowhere apparent in their 
level of commitment and enthusiasm. Second, enormous financial resources 
are poured into the event, whether through sponsorship by public and private 
donors, donation of facilities (e.g., space at the University of Vienna and at 
various local law firms) where the pleading rounds are held, or the costs 
associated with each individual's presence in Vienna that week. Recent years 
have seen an explosion in social events for the professionals in attendance, 
mainly sponsored by Vienna law firms who invite virtually all (non-student) 
participants to lavish receptions held every evening of the week but one. The 
Vis Moot is a unique professional event, owing in large part to the multi-
generational mix and the extraordinarily high level of enthusiasm and 
collegial ity. 
Taken as a whole, the Vis Moot has become one of the most important 
annual gatherings of the lex mercatoria and international arbitration com-
munity. The atmosphere is remarkably informal, and students have many 
opportunities to mix with the top lawyers, arbitrators, and professors in the 
field. Professional conferences are often scheduled around the Moot, as are 
optional special training programs for students. In some respects, the artifice 
of the Moot shapes events in the commercial and legal world. Elite 
practitioners and arbitrators schedule their own work around the Moot, and 
scholars race to complete pertinent publications so that they can be publi-
cized on the Moot Website (hosted by Pace University under the stewardship 
of AI Kritzer), or at least distributed by hand among their colleagues in 
Vienna. Moreover, by focusing on cutting-edge legal issues, the Moot not only 
attracts scholarly debate, but can even push doctrinal change.65 
The Vis Moot has more than succeeded at what it was designed to 
achieve. It has reached large numbers of budding and experienced legal 
professionals from around the globe. Students not only learn about the eISG, 
other hard and soft transnational legal norms, and international commercial 
arbitration, but also catch the internationalist spirit and idealism about lex 
mercatoria that permeate the event. Knowledge and experience, in this 
context, combine to foster beli_ef and commitment, which in turn provide 
fertile grounds for further development of the transnational legal field. The Vis 
65 For example; one issue in the twelfth Moot problem focused on a "glitch" in the new 
Swiss arbitration rules, which were quickly amended to resolve the problem. 
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Moot is a breeder reactor, a "communicative event" in which the "self-
reproducing, worldwide legal discourse" 66 about the lex mercatoria repli-
cates at a geometric rate. It is not only "the place where the next arbitration 
generation is being raised and moulded," but is also "a place where a true 
transnational culture of arbitration is being developed." 67 It is, each spring, 
the place to be, where old-timers and newcomers alike live la vida lex 
mercatoria to the hilt. 
IV. -MULTI-/INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Leaving aside the gradual acceptance among legal professionals that ever more 
empirical studies of the lex mercatoria would be useful, there remain starkly 
diverging views on the value of multi- or interdisciplinary approaches to legal 
topics, particularly among different academic cultures. These differences were 
brought home to me during conversations with colleagues in Germany, some of 
whom urged me il') no uncertain terms to quit the socio-Iegal path. This advice, 
coming in particular from R.I.Z. Director Norbert Horn, whose scholarship 
spans the range from philosophical to practical and also includes a number of 
disciplinary cross-border forays,68 surprised but also provoked me to seek to 
understand the reasons behind such dire warnings. 
My German colleagues advanced three major arguments against inter-
disciplinary work by legal scholars. The first is that considerations of labor-
efficiency (Arbeitsokonomie) preclude anything beyond minimal borrowing 
across disciplinary .Iines.69 Second, institutional concerns caution against such 
66 TEUBNER, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
67 Gabrielle KAUFMANN-KoHLER, NPresident's Message", 23(1) ASA Bulletin (2005), 1. 
68 Hom's oeuvre includes some works that incorporate perspectives gleaned from other 
disciplines. See, e.g.,. Norbert HORN, NPerson und Kontinuitat, Versprechen und Vertrauen: die 
Perspektive des Zivilrechts", in Richard Schenk (Ed.), Kontinuitat der Person: Zum Versprechen 
und Vertrauen (2001), 35-74 [hereinafter: HORN, Person und Kontinuitat] (anthropology); Norbert 
HORN, "Bankwirtschaft und Bankrecht in interdisziplinarer Perspektive", in Detlef Bierbaum I 
Klaus Feinen (Eds.), Bank- und Finanzwirtschaft: Strategien im Wandel (1997), 221-243 
[hereinafter: HORN, Bankwirtschaft] (new economic institutionalism; economic analysis of law). 
More generally, Professor Hom was a member of the Direktorium of the Zentrum' fur 
interdiszipilinare Forschung at the University of Bielefeld from 1974-1981, and also served as 
Managing Director of the Bank Law Division of the Institut fUr Bankwirtschaftrecht und Bankrecht 
at the University of Cologne. 
69 HORN, Bankwirtschaft, supra note 68, at 227 {liEs gibt gute Grunde fur diese fachliche 
Trennung und Arbeitsteilung. Die Problemfulle auf iedem Arbeitsgebiet ist zu gross, als dass man 
mehr als einen Seitenblick auf die Nachbardiszipfin werfen konnte, um sich dann wieder auf das 
eigene Fach tu konzentrieren. '" Die interdisziplinare Orientierung durch Beschaffung 
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endeavours. And third, some argue that the principal task of the legal 
academic is to address normative questions, and in particular to stay "dose to 
practice" and seek solutions to -real problems.70 
As to the first concern, J believe that the drive towards efficiency must 
yield, at least on occasion, to the yearning for deeper insight. Ohnesorge 
rightly argues that "[a]lthough disciplines may share so little at the level of 
theory that they seem to speak in different languages, when specific issues or 
institutions are being studied, especially in a comparative context, the 
contributions of views derived from radically different theoretical starting 
points can be crucial to full understanding." 71 Moreover, some questions -
such as the autonomy of the lex mercatoria - cannot be resolved rhetorically 
by the better argument, but only by evidence. Finally, in my own case, the 
ability to "speak" in multiple disciplinary languages is as vital as being 
bilingual in German and English. 
As for institutional concerns, my colleagues' warnings about the dangers 
of the socio-Iegal path are surely wise in the German academic context, where 
there are few professional opportunities for interdisciplinary scholars,72 
notwendiger Informationen des jeweils anderen Fachs erfolgt .. , moglichst arbeitsokonimisch, d.h. 
seJektiv und restriktiv."j ("There are good reasons for the separation between disciplines and the 
division of academic labor. The abundance of problems needing attention in each field is too large 
to permit anything more than a sidelong glance at the other discipline, before returning to one's 
own field. Interdisciplinary orientation via acquisition of necessary information about the other 
discipline must be carried out in the most labor-efficient way possible, that is, selectively and 
restrictively. U - translation by the author). Later in that same text, Horn warns that interdisciplinary 
scholars run the danger of succumbing to uMethodensynkretismus oder ... der Uferlosigkeit des 
Stoffes und der Betrachtungsweise"("methodological syncretism or the boundlessness of the 
material and approaches" - translation by the author). Ibid., at 232. ' 
70 This priority has led Horn to produce a large body of work that is extremely useful for 
practicing lawyers as well as for advanced students. 
71 John K.M. OHNESORGE, "Understanding Chinese Legal and Business Norms", in 
Felstiner / Gessner, Rules and Networks, supra note 3, at 363-383 (364). 
72 leading socio-Iegal scholars noted in 1998 that it was "mainly [the Volkswagen-
stiftung's] generous support of socio-Iegal research which keeps empirical studies in the field of 
the sociology of law alive in an environment more conducive to doctrinal legal research in 
Germany." GessnerI Budak, in Emerging Legal Certainty, supra note 8, at xv. Socio-Iegal studies 
in Germany are often referred to as an Orchideenfach, that is,an "orchid subject" consisting of 
rare and exotic species that can only thrive in an artificial hot-house atmosphere. This derogatory 
label generally implies that the academic field in question is too specialized and "too academic" 
or cut off from solving problems in the oreal world". I note in passing that this criticism is hardly 
apt when it comes to empirical studies of law (including "law in action" studies), which often have 
important policy implications. 
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despite burgeoning interest in such research.?3 It is disappointing to see that 
socio-Iegal studies, to which German-language scholars have made such 
important theoretical contributions, have been so marginalized in Germany in 
recent decades. By way of contrast, socia-legal studies have experienced 
dramatic growth and achieved a high level of popularity during the same time 
frame in the Common law 74 world. There was a trend toward social scien-
tific studies of law in Germany in the 1970s,75 which was at least temporally 
parallel, if not causally related to the take-off of this trend in the Common law 
world at around the same time.76 I have no explanation at hand for the 
developmental trajectory in Germany,77 but can offer some thoughts on 
recent developments in the United States.78 
73 _ For example, the Zweite Nachwuchs Tagung des Berliner Arbeitskreises Rechts-
wirklichkeit (BAR), which was held in Halle in November 2005, was attended by some 120 
persons, including a handful of the dedicated professors and Privatdozenten actively involved in 
law as an interdisciplinary research topic. Moreover, the Berlin 2007 Joint Meeting of the Law and 
Society Association and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law (International Sociological 
ASsociation) drew nearly 2,500 active participants, albeit not all from Germany . 
• 74 This discussion is based on my knowledge of legal academia in the United States, and 
does not presume to apply equally to Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, where legal 
education is quite different. It nonetheless bears mention that socia-legal studies are also strong in 
those three countries, perhaps even stronger than in the u.s. 
75 See U. ROHL, "1st die Rechtswissenschaft iiberhaupt eine Wissenschaft?" (Vortrag -
Bremen, 08.07.2005), at 10 (describing the failed attempt in the 1970s by German legal academics to 
counter the attack on law's status as a "real science" by turning towards the social sciences). The 
tension between doctrinal and empirical or social scientific approaches is pemaps most pronounced 
in the field of constitutional or public law. Already in the 1970s, German legal scholars debated the 
need for social scientific studies in the field of constitutionalism. -Powerful calls for multidisciplinary 
approaches to the topic were countered by resistance from those who feared dilution of the legal 
monopoly. For a contemporary study that confirms the relative lack, while Simultaneously 
demonstrating the value of cross-disciplinary approaches to the question of constitutional 
amendment, see Andreas BUSCH, "Das oft geanderte Grundgesetz", in Wolfgang Merkel I Andreas 
Busch (Eds.), Demokratie in Ost und West Fur Klaus von Beyme (1999), 549--574. 
76 See, generally, Bryant GARTH I Joyce STERLING, "From Legal Realism to Law and 
Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Activist State", 32 Law and Society Review 
(1998),409; David TRUBEK, NBack to the Future: The Short and Happy Life of the Law and Society 
Movement", 18(1) Florida State University Law Review (1990), 4-55. 
77 For a recent and thorough analysis of the German developments, see Michael WRASI 
"Rechtssoziologie und Law and Society - Die deutsche Rechtssoziologie zwischen Krise un 
Neuaufbruch", 27 Zeitschrift fUr Rechtssozio/ogie (2006), 289--312. For a comparative perspectivi 
see Kristoffel GRECHENIG I Martin GELTER, NThe Transatlantic Divergence in legal Thougr 
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism", University of Sl. Gallen Law ar 
Economics Researc;;h Paper Series, Working Paper No. 25-2007. 
78 For a critical view of these developments in the U.S., see Anthony D'AMATO, "Th 
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One possible explanation for the growth of socia-legal studies in 
Common Law settings, but not in Germany, relates to the status preferences of 
legal academics. Compared to the lofty notion of legal science (Rechts-
wissenschaft) 79 that permeates the German academic enterprise, legal 
training in the Common Law world is of humbler origin.80 In the United 
States, for example, legal education was initially in the hands of the legal 
profession itself, and only gradually migrated over to the universities. "In 1800 
apprenticeship was almost universal; today, school training is, practically 
speaking, the only real path to the bar." 81 Notwithstanding the dominant role 
of the universities, however, legal education in the United States is regulated 
by the legal profession via the American Bar Association (ABA), which keeps 
the law schools under tight rein through its power of accreditation. 
Many contemporary American law professors, while not too proud to 
accept substantially higher salaries than those paid to their colleagues in the 
social sciences and humanities, would chafe at the suggestion that they toil in 
a vocational field. The reluctance among many U.S. legal educators to think of 
legal education as a "trade school" has been aggravated by increasing ABA 
pressure to beef up the skills training component of legal education,82 as well 
Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education", Northwestern University School ofLaw Public Law and 
Legal Theory Series, No. 06-32 (2006). 
79 See, generally, ROHl, supra note 75, for a discussion of the perennial debates about 
whether legal science (Rechtswissenschaft) is a 'true science'. According to Ruhl, ibid., at 12-14, law 
is a 'cultural science' (Kulturwissenschaft) in the sense articulated by Rickert in 1898, and 
characterized by interpretive methodology, in contrast to the explanatory methods employed in 
connection with the study of natural phenomena (Naturwissenschaft). Rickert's dichotomy, however, 
does not adequately account for the social sciences, which partake of both elements. Elsewhere, Ruhl 
characterizes legal history, legal sociology and comparative law as desGriptive/explanatory "Seins-
Wissenschaften" - as mere auxiliary "Hilfswissenschaften" that support but are subordinate to the 
"Solf-Wissenschaft" of legal dogmatics (Rechtsdogmatik)~ Ibid., at 10. 
80 This is not to deny the fact that the Continental tradition of legal science was influential 
in the U.S., particularly during the formative years of university-based legal education. See, e.g., 
laura I. ApPLEMAN, "The Rise of the Modern American Law School: How Professionalization, 
German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of legal Education", 39 New England 
Law Review (2005), 251; Lawrence M. FRIEDMAN I Gunther TEUBNER, "legal Education and legal 
Integration: European Hopes and American Experience", ;n M. Cappelletti I M. Seccombe / J. 
Weiler (Eds.), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, Volume 1 
(Methods, Tools and Institutions), Book 3 (Forces and Potential for a European Identity) (1986), 
345-380 (355-356). 
81 FRIEDMAN/TEUBNER, supra note 80, at 355. 
82 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
Legal Education and Professional Development - An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task 
Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992) (MacCrate Report). 
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as to regularize the status of legal writing instructors and clinicians, who 
historically had been treated as second-class members of the faculty and not 
eligible for tenure. These (often hotly contested) changes in U.s. law faculties 
have been accompanied by a temporally para"el change in the candidate 
pool and in hiring preferences for tenure-track slots on u.s. law faculties. In a 
nutshell, there has been a noticeable rise in the number of Ph.D.83 holders in 
the law job applicant pool, along with a rising desire on the part of law 
faculties to hire professors who are capable of multi- or interdisciplinary (and 
particularly empirical) research.84 
It is conceivable that these two trends 85 are not merely coincidental, but 
also causally related. It may be, for example, that the U.S. legal academy is 
striving towards the "scientific high ground" as a reaction or form of resistance 
to the skills-oriented and democratizing pressures brought to bear by the ABA, 
or that the trend is simply a way for the legal academy to enhance its 
intellectual status by embracing the scientism that dominates U.S. social 
sciences. Whether either of these explanations are (or could ever be proven) 
correct, it is worth noting the paradox that legal education (or at least legal 
scholarship) in the u.s. (and elsewhere in the Common Law world) is edging 
towards a greater degree of "scientific" conceit, while German legal education 
and scholarship are, at the same time, placing greater emphasis on skills 
training. 
An alternative explanation for the socio-Iegal trend in the United States 
might simply be widespread consensus on the superiority of the approach. 
The "sociological jurisprudence" and Legal Realist traditions of the early 20th 
century have pre-disposed u.s. legal educators to be sceptical of purely 
83 Since the Ph.D. degree in the U.S. is not available in the field of law, the growing 
number of law professors with Ph.D. degrees points unambiguously towards a trend of hiring 
faculty members who have multidisciplinary credentials (such as in anthropology, economics, 
history, literature, philosophy, political science, or sociology), or who have been trained in special 
interdisciplinary programs (s.uch as the University of California, Berkeley'S 30-year old program in 
Jurisprudence and Social Policy). U.S. lawdoctorates are generally designated as S.J.D. or J.S.D. 
degrees, and it is rare for U.S. lawyers or law professors to pursue this type of advanced degree. 
For an historical perspective, see Gail J .. HUPPER, "The Rise of an Academic Doctorate in law: 
Origins Through World War II", Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, No. 196 (2007). 
84 The Law and Economics movement was the vanguard of this trend in law school 
hiring, starting already in the 1980s. The trend towards socia-legal hiring and booming interest in 
empirical studies is a more recent phenomenon. 
85 I point to these trends wholly on the basis of personal experience as a faculty member 
at various U.S. law schools since the late 1980s. I would be remiss if I did not call for empirical 
research to substantiate my assertions and track these developments. 
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doctrinal (i.e., dogmatische) approaches, even while most acknowledge that 
their role includes preparing students to pass a state bar examination at the 
end of their studies.86 From this perspective, legal doctrine divorced from 
consideration of causes and consequences is simply incomplete, in both the 
scientific (scholarly) and the pedagogic contexts of law as an academic 
discipline. Such a pedagogic approach would ill-prepare students for a life in 
the law, where "good legal strategies are a function of social and cultural 
dynamics that owe little indeed to the force of legal logic. [Rather,] the 
cultural, the social, and the political create possibilities for reform through 
litigation quite beyond those sanctioned or even hinted at by the governing 
legal standards." 87 
Taken together, the affinity of the u.s, legal system for "outside" 
perspectives on law provides at best a partial explanation for the currerit 
popularity of socio-Iegal and empirical approaches to law, and must be 
combined with institutional factors, such as those noted earlier, in order to 
explain the trend. Yet the fact that socio-Iegal studies are also trendy in other 
Common Law countries suggests that additional factors, including legal 
culture, might well bear on a fuller answer to this question. 
Returning once more to my German colleagues' arguments for quitting 
the socio-Iegal path, it remains to discuss the third reason, which is rooted in 
the notion that such work is a detour from the fundamentally normative nature 
of the legal academic enterprise.88 Yet the ability to answer questions about 
"how law should be" must, in my view, rest on solid knowledge about actual 
conditions of law and society, including (but not limited to) knowledge of 
how the economic world works. This reservation aside, I take the point that 
we cannot excise our own views and values from our scholarly and pedagogic 
86 In contrast to Germany, where many if not most students spend substantial time at the 
Repetitor prior to sitting for their First State Examination, American "bar review" courses tend to 
be quite short. 
87 Steven l. WINTER, A Clearing in the Forest Law, Life, and Mind (2001), xiii. "What 
legal actors need ... is something like a cognitive map of the cultural models and other social 
constructs that animate. thinking and decisionmaking among lawyers, judges, and laypersons 
alike." Ibid. 
88 See, e.g., Norbert HORN, Einfiihrung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie 
(3. Auflage, 2004); HORN, Person und Kontinuitat, supra note 68. See also Norbert HORN, "Codes 
of Conduct for MNEs and Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An International Process of Learning and 
Law Making", in Norbert Horn (Ed.), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational 
Enterprises (1980), 45 (61) (noting as a weakness of transnational commercial law that it is 
developed by intemational commercial practice even though this practice does not necessarily 
meet the ethical and socio-economic standards of modern society). 
Rev. dr. unif. 2007 759 
Helen E. Hartnell 
activities.89 Indeed, much of my _ academic interest in legal professionals is 
animated by curiosity about how our personal commitments, whatever their 
source, affect the course of the law, and by the question «cui bono?" 90 
V.- CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, I believe that much legal scholarship, including that devoted to lex 
mercatoria as well as to broader issues surrounding uniform law, results from 
the various commitments of past, current, and future generations of lawyers 
and legal academics. Professional curiosity, like so many other personal 
attributes, is rooted in our values and interests, however dimly we may 
perceive or acknowledge them. From my American (and deeply Legal Realist) 
perspective, the reflected vida lex mercatoria is - with apologies to Socrates -
decidedly worth living, especially when combined with a skeptical empirical 
approach towards received wisdom. 
89 See Richard CRASWELL, liDo Trade Customs Exist", in j.5. Kraus / S.D. Walt (Eds.), The 
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (2000), 118-148 (118-119) (arguing 
that the "goals, beliefs and other normative premises" of persons undertaking to identify the 
existence of trade customs lIinevitably" playa role in this process). 
90 In this regard, it strikes me as odd that some proponents of lex mercatoria identify 
themselves as IIprogressives" and label me ·conservative" because I have on occasion called for 
the observance of some limits on party autonomy. See, e.g., Helen E. HARTNELL, "Rousing the 
Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods", 18 Yale Journal of International Law (1993),1-93. This inversion of the ordinary meaning 
of these terms reflects the presumption of radical party autonomy that is-prevalent among those 
committed to the transnational legal order, according to which State-imposed constraints are 
anathema. The tenn Uprogressive", in their usage, takes ona neoliberal glare, while ·conservative" 
implies an anachronistic belief in regulation by the State. 
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